Abstract: Opportunistic networks are a new and specific type of mobile peer-to-peer networks where end-to-end connectivity cannot be assumed. These networks present compelling challenges, especially from a security perspective, as interactive protocols are infeasible in such environments. In this article, we focus on the problem of key management in the framework of content-based forwarding and opportunistic networks. After analysing this issue and identifying specific security threats such as Sybil attacks, we propose a specific key management scheme that enables the bootstrapping of local, topology-dependent security associations between a node and its neighbours along with the discovery of the neighbourhood topology, thanks to the use of pseudonym certificates and encapsulated signatures.
Introduction
Opportunistic networking (The Haggle Project, 2006; Hui et al., 2005 ) is a new paradigm aiming at enabling communication through highly heterogeneous networks by relying on dynamic transmission of messages whenever communication opportunities arise: such communication thus does not rely on a routing infrastructure and is peer-to-peer in essence. The delay-tolerant paradigm is a suitable approach to address the lack of connectivity and the mobility akin to opportunistic networks. In opportunistic networks, mobility and disconnections are the rule rather than the exception, therefore opportunistic networks are delay-tolerant by nature. The lack of end-to-end connectivity is a key difference between such networks and mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). This major constraint implies that it is impossible to establish an end-to-end path from source to destination and forwarding decisions are only based on a local view of the network.
Furthermore, opportunistic networks are more general than MANETs, because disseminational communication is the rule rather than conversational communication. A concept that nicely fits with the disseminational networking model is offered by content-based communication (Carzaniga and Wolf, 2003; Carzaniga et al., 2004) whereby messages are forwarded from source to destinations based on their content instead of explicit addresses. In content-based applications nodes declare their interests through receiver advertisements and simply publish content that they wish to disseminate, rather than explicitly defining destination nodes for packets. Intermediate nodes set up and update their forwarding table based on the receiver advertisements, and take forwarding decisions implicitly by looking up published content in their forwarding table.
The flexibility of content-based opportunistic networks come on the other hand with a high cost in increased exposure in terms of data security. Security services and in particular key management should be revisited to reflect the characteristics of such networks; in particular security services should also be flexible and self-organised. Moreover, privacy protection is particularly challenging due to the content-based messaging paradigm. The protection of the content with classical security mechanisms would indeed conflict with the forwarding functions since the latter rely on the very content that is being transmitted for their basic operations. An interesting idea to meet the privacy requirements of content-based forwarding in opportunistic networks consists of multiple layer commutative encryption (MLCE) that allows to perform secure operations on encrypted content as proposed in Shikfa et al. (2009a Shikfa et al. ( , 2009b . When using MLCE, one needs to encrypt the data with several layers of encryption corresponding to lr next hops. Such a solution therefore calls for an innovative key management scheme that should ensure local and self-organised security associations between a node and its neighbourhood: each node should share a key with all its neighbours that are less than lr hops away. The key management should thus depend heavily on the neighbourhood topology which is fundamental for the multi-layer encryption scheme to work properly. Because of the lack of infrastructure and the peer-to-peer nature of the network, this also means that the neighbourhood topology itself should be securely discovered.
The main goal of this article is therefore to analyse the challenges raised by key management in order to come-up with a dedicated key management solution. This solution should feature local, self-organised and topology-dependent bootstrapping of security associations along with a secure neighbourhood discovery. In order to optimise the performance of the scheme, and to cope with the dependency between topology and security, it is indeed more efficient to perform both neighbourhood discovery and security associations with all lr-hops neighbours together rather than in two separate steps. We achieve this goal by using an authenticated version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement together with encapsulated signatures that protect the integrity of key management messages at each hop. Moreover, since the security of MLCE is directly linked to the number of consecutive colluding nodes, it is important to guarantee that each node can claim only one identity and only one position in the neighbourhood. Creation of bogus identities through Sybil attacks would then be a crucial threat against which our scheme is protected thanks to an off-line identity manager (IM) as presented in Shikfa et al. (2010) . Compared with Shikfa et al. (2010) , this article includes new developments concerning the security evaluation of the solution and a more precise evaluation of the performance of the scheme.
In this article, we first analyse the new security challenges regarding key management in the context of opportunistic networks and extract important requirements for key management in this context. We then present a self-organised and local mechanism that bootstraps security associations with the discovery of the neighbourhood topology thanks to the use of certificates and signatures chains. The proposed scheme relies on two phases: a first step where nodes are connected to an IM that provides them with unique pseudonyms, and a second step where the opportunistic communication takes place and where there is no need for the IM. The pseudonyms are not used as certified identities but only serve the purpose of withstanding Sybil attacks.
Problem statement
In this section, we first present the privacy issues pertaining to content-based communication in opportunistic networks. We then define the security requirements of a key management protocol in these specific peer-to-peer networks and present the threat model that we consider.
Privacy in content-based opportunistic networks
As mentioned in the introduction, content-based forwarding solutions raise entirely new privacy concerns: since nodes may not want to reveal the content of packets to entities other than destination(s), forwarding decisions should be taken over encrypted information. Shikfa et al. (2009a) propose an interesting approach to meet the conflicting requirements between forwarding and privacy in content-based opportunistic networks. The idea of this approach is to use multiple commutative encryption layers in order to ensure end-to-end confidentiality: packets are encrypted with multiple keys where each of them is shared by a different pair of nodes. Thanks to this scheme, intermediate nodes securely compare published content and encrypted interests on the fly.
Even though it is impossible to establish an end-to-end path between source and destination, nodes can determine the lr next hops with a local knowledge of the network. Each node establishes a secure channel with nodes that are lr hops away. Moreover, the proposed scheme is commutative in the sense that {{m} k1 } k2 = {{m} k2 } k1 , thus layers can be removed in any order.
While sending a new packet, the source first encrypts it lr times with lr different keys, each of them being shared with one of the lr next hops. Thanks to the commutativity of the encryption scheme, whenever an intermediate node receives an encrypted packet, it first removes one layer of encryption, and then compares the encrypted form of receiver advertisements and published content to take a forwarding decision. Before forwarding the packet, in order to ensure the confidentiality at the same level, the same intermediate node adds another encryption layer using the key that is shared with its lrth next hop. By removing old encryption layers and replacing them with the new ones, the same confidentiality degree is always ensured based on only a local knowledge of the network. The security of the scheme of course strongly depends on this lr parameter: the content of a packet can only be discovered if lr consecutive nodes collude.
In order to illustrate this scheme, we define a simple network with five nodes and we set lr = 2. Whenever Node 1 wishes to send a receiver advertisement raising its interest on a keyword w, w is encrypted both with k 12 and k 13 . When Node 2 receives this packet, it removes one encryption layer using k 12 , updates its forwarding table with the partial information and finally adds another encryption layer using k 24 before sending it to Node 3. Each node follows the same procedure. When Node 5 publishes some content with the same keyword w, the transitive and commutative properties of MLCE allow intermediate nodes to correctly forward this packet to Node 1. This scenario is summarised in Figure 1 .
In Shikfa et al. (2009a Shikfa et al. ( , 2009b where MLCE is proposed and described, the problem of key management is overlooked. We address this problem by analysing first the general requirements of key management in the context of opportunistic networks and then the more specific requirements of topology-dependent key management, in order to come up with a complete solution dedicated to MLCE. Notes: The payload and the keyword corresponding to the content are encrypted separately.
Intermediate nodes can remove one encryption layer, look-up the result in their forwarding table, then they add an encryption layer and forward the packet to the next hop.
Key management requirements

Requirements akin to opportunistic networks
Key management in opportunistic networks is a challenging task. The lack of end-to-end connectivity underpinning opportunistic networks has indeed strong implications on the problem of key management. For instance, nodes cannot agree on end-to-end keys:
key agreement can only be local. Furthermore, online centralised authority or security server cannot be used if end-to-end connectivity cannot be assumed. This implies in particular that public key encryption is not suitable to opportunistic communication as it requires an online public key infrastructure that generates and manages the public key certificates. Key management for identity-based cryptography is more adapted to opportunistic networks as it only requires an offline public key generator. Therefore identitybased cryptography is generally a good candidate for opportunistic networks because they do not require certificates (and they are used by Asokan et al. (2007) in this context). However, identity-based cryptographic tools are not suitable for content-based forwarding, whereby messages are forwarded depending on their content and the interests advertised by nodes, therefore the (set of) destination is unknown at the source.
A suitable key management solution for content-based communication in opportunistic networks should thus be local and self-organised and should not depend on the identities of the nodes.
Specific requirements of the MLCE solution
The security of MLCE strongly depends on the location of the nodes in the topology. Indeed, nodes need to establish security associations in the form of pairwise keys with all nodes that are at most lr hops away. Given the layered structure of MLCE, the assurance of privacy strongly depends on the position of nodes in terms of hop-distance: the key agreement scheme should therefore be bootstrapped on the topology of the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood topology also needs to be discovered because of the lack of infrastructure.
The MLCE solution assumes indeed that the topology overlay used for content-based communication is a tree generated in a local and decentralised way. This implies that each node is aware of its lr-hop neighbourhood topology. Securely discovering the neighbourhood topology is yet a non-trivial task which in turn requires security services because nodes should guarantee their claimed hop-distance to their neighbours and should not claim fake distances which would have an impact on the security of MLCE. Classical solutions to guarantee the hop-distance for more than one-hop (Hu et al., 2005a (Hu et al., , 2002a use cryptographic mechanisms and assume that nodes already own verifiable keying materials (e.g., identity certificates).
Hence there is a cyclic dependency between secure neighbourhood discovery and key management in MLCE similar to the dependency cycle between secure routing and security services in MANETs identified in Bobba et al. (2003) . In order to take into account this dependency between network topology and security, and in order to avoid running two separate protocols, one for neighbourhood discovery and one for local key management, security associations should thus be locally bootstrapped along with a lightweight neighbourhood discovery solution.
Threats
Generic attacks
In order to bootstrap security associations and discover the neighbourhood topology each node should launch a dedicated communication protocol. Thus, as with the design of any communication protocol, the key management protocol should consider the regular attacks which can be classified as follows:
• Passive attacks: malicious nodes only eavesdrop on communication; they do not take part in the forwarding process and therefore can only discover the content of the packets if those are not protected. Therefore, protocol messages should be encrypted in order to prevent such attacks.
• Active attacks: malicious nodes can either modify packets or launch replay or man-in-the-middle attacks. In the particular case of key management in MLCE, the goal of active attackers would be to discover a key by establishing security associations with a legitimate node without complying with the local topology. The impact of pollution or other kind of attacks where nodes only aim at disrupting the protocol without gaining any advantage, are not analysed in this article.
Sybil attack
In addition to classical attacks, the key management protocol should take into account the attacks specific to MLCE. The security of MLCE is indeed based on the parameter lr and if lr consecutive nodes collude they can break the MLCE scheme. Thus, if nodes can launch Sybil attacks (Douceur, 2002) by simulating many different identities claiming different hop distances they can weaken the security of the MLCE scheme. Indeed, in this case one single node (the malicious node) simulating lr identities and claiming different positions for each identity would receive one key per layer and would therefore easily decrypt the content of packets although it does not have the right to. Hence, a node should only have a unique unspoofable identity (pseudonym) and a global mechanism of identity management has to be defined.
To summarise, content-based opportunistic networking requires a local and self-organised key management mechanism. Nodes should establish key pairs with all nodes which are at most lr hops away. Moreover, nodes should also be able to determine the position of each node in order to achieve the security goals of MLCE, and therefore security associations should be bootstrapped along with neighbourhood discovery. Finally, as with any regular protocol, the new key management protocol should be protected from regular network attacks.
Proposed solution
In order to meet the requirements detailed in the previous section, we propose a solution for bootstrapping security associations which features two phases. Indeed, nodes require anchors to be uniquely identified in the network, and each node should have only one valid anchor to prevent Sybil attacks. Therefore, we propose first a setup phase, during which nodes are connected to an IM that generates and distributes these anchors in the form of certificates. The keying material received during this phase can be considered as long-term keying material that allows the computation of short-term keys resulting from the establishment of security associations in a secure way.
During the regular network operations, nodes do not need to communicate with the IM anymore and the long term keys are not used by the application. We hereafter describe these two phases in detail.
Setup phase
During the setup phase, nodes contact an IM, which is a lightweight security server that generates pseudonyms and certificates on-the-fly but does not manage certificates as in classical public key infrastructures. For the sake of clarity, we assume the existence of a single IM, but the infrastructure could be more sophisticated with a distributed architecture for example. The IM generates a public/private key pair pk IM /sk IM , and pk IM is known by all nodes. The role of the IM is twofolds:
1 Enforcing privacy: the IM first provides nodes with pseudonyms in order to enforce privacy. In opportunistic networks real identities are indeed meaningless. Hence, using actual identities only incurs a privacy threat with no additional advantage over pseudonyms.
2 Prevention of Sybil attacks: the IM links the pseudonym to a real identity and a public/private key pair and certifies it. Indeed, even though identities are meaningless, nodes should be restrained to a unique pseudonym otherwise they could have several identities, which would lead to Sybil attacks. If a node could impersonate other nodes or simply produce several identities for himself, it could pretend to be at several positions at the same time, and therefore break the multi-layer scheme.
To fulfil these tasks, each node N i first generates a public/private key pair pk i /sk i and then sends pk i to the IM. The IM first verifies that N i owns the associated private key with a challenge-response exchange, and then requests the node for some information I i to uniquely identify N i . The requested set of information remains the same for all nodes at anytime (e.g., full name, date and place of birth) and is thoroughly verified by the IM (with the help of official documents like ID card or passport for example). The IM uses this set of information I i together with a master key K (known only by the IM) in a message authentication code (MAC) function to generate a pseudonym for the node:
We assume that the MAC function used is hiding, which means that the MAC does not reveal any information about the authenticated message. In other words, P i does not leak information with respect to I i . The IM then provides N i with a certificate C i which links the public key of N i with its pseudonym, by signing these information:
The information exchange protocol between the IM and a node N i is presented in Figure 2 . Note that a node can obtain several certificates with different public keys, but all the certificates include the same pseudonym and can therefore not be used for Sybil attacks.
This certification process, ensures that each node has only one pseudonym, and the corresponding certificate can be used to prove that this pseudonym was generated by the IM and is not random. Therefore, the use of this certificate effectively prevents Sybil attacks. 
When the node N i has retrieved its certificate C i , the setup phase ends and N i can enter the runtime phase. During the runtime phase, communication is supposed to be delay-tolerant, therefore, the IM is unreachable and secure communication should be possible without accessing the IM.
Bootstrapping local security associations
We now assume that all nodes have already performed the setup phase and own pseudonym certificates as mentioned in the previous section. During the second phase nodes need to establish ephemeral security associations by sharing keys with all their neighbours which are at distance less than lr hops. As mentioned previously, this key agreement depends on the local topology and therefore requires a secure neighbourhood discovery. In order to optimise the number of message exchanges and to cope with the dependency between security and topology, we propose a local key agreement protocol along with neighbourhood discovery: one protocol run provides the initiator with both a correct view of its neighbourhood topology at lr hops distance and shared secrets with all lr-hops or less neighbours in a batch. On the one hand, the neighbourhood discovery mechanism is inspired by secure routing protocols (like Hu et al., 2005b ) with the noticeable difference that our solution is based on a hop count limit instead of targeting a destination: it therefore relies on signature chains to guarantee the integrity of the discovered topology. Contrary to secure routing in MANET, the goal of our protocol is not to perform end-to-end secure routing which is irrelevant in opportunistic networks, but simply to discover the local topology of the network. On the other hand, the key agreement scheme is derived from an authenticated version of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, also called the station to station protocol (Diffie et al., 1992) . We therefore assume that all nodes know a group G with generator g suitable for a Diffie-Hellman protocol. Furthermore, all exponentiations are taken modulo the cardinal of the group |G| and we do not mention this modular extraction in the sequel of the article for the sake of clarity.
The protocol features four main steps. First a node initiates a security association request for lr hops, this request is then forwarded to neighbours until the lr-th hop receives it. Then, a security association reply is sent to the initiator through the reverse path of the request and finally the initiator can compute the shared keys. These four steps are detailed hereafter and an example of the execution of the protocol over one path is given in Table 1 . 
Verifies σ 1 and randomly chooses r 3 ∈ Z + |G| and ρ 3
Verifies σ 1 and randomly chooses r 4 ∈ Z + |G| and ρ 4
Security association reply (remaining hop count = 0)
Verify the validity of the reply Shared keys: g r 1 r 2 with N 2 , g r 1 r 3 with N 3 and g r 1 r 4 with N 4 One established 3-hop path: N 2 , N 3 , N 4
Notes: The initiator N1 discovers its 3-hop neighbourhood and establishes security associations with three nodes. The underlined font indicates changed message fields, relative to the previous message of the same type.
Initiation of security association request
When a node N s wants to establish security associations with its neighbours, at distance less than lr hops, it needs to initiate a security association request. It first chooses a random r s ∈ Z + |G| and computes its Diffie-Hellman share g rs in order to establish short term keys with each of the neighbours. In order to prevent impersonation, N s should also send its certificate received from IM during the previous phase. Finally, since the Security Association Request should not be forwarded after the lr-th hop, an additional iterator should be included in the message and should be decremented at each hop. N s signs all these information to prove their authenticity and broadcast the following message:
SARq is just an identifier standing for security association request and σ s is a signature of the whole message with the private key sk s , to be more precise σ s = signature sks (SARq, lr, C s , g rs ). To be more precise, N i first checks the authenticity of the initial request message by verifying the signature of the initiator. To do so, it reconstructs the initial request message which is:
Processing of security association requests
< SARq, r, f irst(Certif icate list), f irst(DH share list), f irst(signature list) >
where first(.) designates the first element in a list. lr is computed as the addition of remaining hop count and the number of elements in the lists minus one. Then, the initial signature f irst(signature list) is checked thanks to the public key of the initiator which can be found in f irst(Certif icate list).
If the signature is valid, the intermediate node N i processes the request as follows:
• remaining hop count is decreased by one
• N i appends its own certificate C i to Certif icate list in order to give a proof of its pseudonym P i and to provide its public key pk i
• N i needs to provide a Diffie-Hellman share for the key agreement, hence N i draws a random number r i and then appends g ri to DH share list
• N i needs to prove the integrity and authenticity of the modified request therefore it computes a signature σ i of the modified message plus a random number ρ i : ρ i is a random number that is revealed in the Security Association Reply as described in the next section. Indeed, in order to verify the authenticity of the path, the reply message should follow the same path in the reverse direction. Therefore, in addition to their Diffie-Hellman shares, each node also generates a random number ρ i kept secret, before signing the message. This random number guarantees that the reply returns through N i : if the reply does not pass through N i then σ i cannot be verified and therefore the message is considered as not valid. We assume that the signature scheme does not leak any information about the signed message, therefore it is impossible to deduce the value ρ i only from the signature σ i . After this processing, the message is broadcasted, except if the message reached the lr-th hop.
Security association reply
The reply has to follow the reverse path from which the discovery request has been forwarded, therefore the iterator is no longer needed. The reply mainly consists of the list of certificates, signatures and Diffie-Hellman shares at the last hop of the request. Furthermore, intermediate nodes N i that receive back the reply, need to reveal the random number ρ i they used in the request to allow the verification of their signature. Therefore the general format of the reply is: If all these verifications succeed, N s and the neighbours listed in the message compute their shared keys. The key shared with N i is computed as (g ri ) rs by the initiator and as (g rs ) ri by N i . N s also knows of one lr-hop path in its neighbourhood. Note that, for one security association request, the initiator should receive many replies, one per possible lr-hop path. Thanks to this mechanism, the initiator can fully construct its lr-hop neighbourhood topology and establish security associations with all the nodes in this neighbourhood.
Key computation
Summary
The complete mechanism enables to bootstrap security associations along with neighbourhood discovery in opportunistic networks: each reply results in the initiator knowing one lr-hop path and sharing keys with all the nodes on this path. With all the replies, the initiator can thus securely construct the topology of its lr-hop neighbourhood. The proposed mechanism is local and self-organised and therefore complies with the delay-tolerant nature of opportunistic networks.
The mechanism relies on two phases: a setup phase where nodes have access to the IM and the runtime phase where the opportunistic communication actually takes place.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the security and performance of the proposed scheme.
Evaluation of the setup phase
This setup phase, whereby nodes communicate with the IM in order to get pseudonym certificates, protects the proposed mechanism against Sybil attacks. Indeed, since the pseudonym of a node is strongly linked with its real identity, nodes can only have one pseudonym, and malicious nodes cannot simulate multiple identities. Hence malicious nodes cannot share several keys corresponding to different distances with respect to a given node and thus cannot access any private message they are not authorised to.
The proposed IM has a completely different role than classical certification authorities. The role of the IM is not to certify identities, it just certifies that a given node has one and only one pseudonym. The IM is lightweight by design because it does not need to keep track of the certificates it delivered. Each time a node asks for a certificate, the IM generates the associated pseudonym on-the-fly by requesting the same information, and the resulting pseudonym is always the same for a given node. During networking operations, the IM is not required anymore and the proposed scheme enables local and self-organised security associations.
Analysis of the security association mechanism
One of the main goal of the scheme is to bootstrap security associations between nodes which are less than lr hops away. In this section we analyse the security aspects of this feature.
Protection against passive attackers
Since the establishment of security associations is simply based on the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol, eavesdropping is inherently prevented thanks to the hardness of the discrete logarithm and the computational Diffie-Hellman problems (Stinson, 1995) . Indeed, since given g r1 , it is difficult to retrieve r 1 and given g, g r1 , g r2 it is difficult to compute g r1r2 , key shares can be sent in clear and an adversary node cannot discover the key resulting from the association. Therefore, the security of the scheme against passive attackers results directly from the security of the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Protection against man-in-the-middle attack
Since the message exchange is not performed by only two nodes, the security guarantee offered by the Diffie-Hellman protocol is not sufficient, especially in the presence of active attackers. The first type of attacks that can be launched by an active attacker is the man-in-the-middle attack. Such attacks are effectively prevented by the use of an authenticated version of the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol that adds signatures computed over key shares. Indeed, no node can forge a network discovery request initiated by node N s because it requires the private key of N s .
Incidence of replay attacks
An authentic request by N s can still be replayed by a malicious node. However, a malicious node which replays a neighbourhood discovery request cannot discover a shared key with other nodes because it does not know the random number r s . Furthermore, since nodes still answer several identical requests by processing them the same way (and by using the same Diffie-Hellman share), this does not create false security associations, therefore this attack is not critical from a security perspective.
On the modification of the STS protocol
As explained in Section 3.2, our protocol for establishing security associations is a modified version of the STS protocol (Diffie et al., 1992) . The modifications with respect to the original STS protocol are twofolds:
• in the STS protocol, messages are signed and then encrypted with the shared key, whereas in our protocol we remove this encryption process
• our protocol is composed of two message exchanges, whereas the original STS protocol requires a third message exchange whereby the originator signs both its share and the share of the other party.
Concerning the second point, we adopted this design for performance reason. It is possible to stick to the STS original version and add a third message sent by the originator back to the lr next hops in which the shares of the other nodes are signed by the originator. Yet the only additional security offered by this step is a protection against replay attack, and the incidence of this attack is minor as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Concerning the first point, Diffie et al. used the encryption with the shared key g rsri as a proof of knowledge of g rsri . In a more recent work, Krawczyk et al. (2003) showed that using encryption as a proof of knowledge is insecure and can lead to a misbinding attack: an attacker could lead N s and N i to share a key g rsri but N s would think that the key g rsri is shared with the attacker instead of N i . The attacker still does not get knowledge of the key g rsri , but this could still be problematic in critical scenarios such as banking (money could be credited the attacker instead of N i ). Krawczyk et al. (2003) proposed an alternative scheme called SIGMA (for SIGn and MAc) to remove this flaw. In fact, all these issues are pertaining to the authentication part of the STS protocol. The goal of STS or SIGMA is to authenticate the entities N s and N i , and at the same time to share a key between these entities, thus binding the key with an identity.
In our protocol, this strong authentication mechanism is not required. The goal for N s is to share keys with the lr next hops, but the identity of these nodes has no importance for N s . The use of the authenticated version of Diffie-Hellman is only justified by the fact that N s needs to make sure that the lr exchanged keys correspond to lr different nodes, the actual identity of those nodes making no difference (and pseudonyms are used to prevent linking a node to its real identity anyway). In case of a misbinding attack as defined in Krawczyk (2003) on our protocol, the attacker still needs to add its certificate, and prove that it is a different node from the others in the chain. This is the only relevant information for N s as, there is no trust relationship implied by our protocol beyond the fact that the lr nodes are different, contrary to the general case targeted by STS and SIGMA.
The modifications that we brought to the STS protocol, while insecure for binding authenticated entities with a shared key, offer the right security for our protocol and provide a performance increase.
Evaluation of the neighbourhood discovery mechanism
We now analyse the security of the second main goal of the proposed scheme, which is to securely discover the neighbourhood topology.
The mechanism of encapsulated signatures prevents most basic active attacks, and makes tampering of security association messages difficult:
• The mechanism of encapsulated signatures in security association requests protects the integrity of messages at each step. Therefore an intermediate node cannot forge the message of a previous node, in particular it cannot change the value of an iterator, nor can it modify the value of the Diffie-Hellman share. An intermediate node can only undo some steps to remove some nodes from the path and extend the neighbourhood discovery hops in a greyhole attempt (Hu et al., 2005a) ; i.e., by selectively dropping some messages or by removing some elements in the lists of the security association request message. But in this case the deleted nodes will not accept to forward the reply because their certificates are not in the certificate list anymore. To be successful this attack thus requires a way to circumvent the deleted nodes and in this case it is a wormhole and not a greyhole attack anymore.
• The mechanism also ensures that the path of the reply is the reverse of the request thanks to the use of the random numbers ρ i . Indeed the signatures in the request messages cannot be verified if the ρ i are not revealed and nodes only reveal them in reply messages if they were involved in the request path. An alternate solution would be to sign all the reply messages, but this would be more costly.
Wormhole attacks (Hu et al., 2003) that completely circumvent the deleted nodes and avoid message discarding can be successful and the source node would end up with a fake neighbourhood topology in that it would contain nodes which are more than lr-hops away. The impact of this attack is however the same as the collusion attack in MLCE: if lr consecutive nodes collude they can break the scheme and access encrypted messages. Hence, it is possible to mitigate this attack by increasing the security parameter lr, which is chosen according to the expected maximum number of consecutive malicious nodes. Furthermore, we assume that nodes can securely determine their one-hop neighbours by using distance bounding techniques Shokri et al., 2009) , which further mitigates the wormhole threat.
Performance evaluation
The scheme requires asymmetric cryptography and signature computations to guarantee the local neighbourhood topology. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism takes into account the need to minimise the number of signatures and increase its performance. The use of the random numbers ρ i avoids signing both requests and replies, and enables the signature of requests only, thus decreasing both the computation and communication P900 features a PNX4000 156 MHz processor, while nowadays smartphones are equipped with processors exceeding 1 GHz with hardware accelerators (e.g., the HTC HD2 which features a 1 GHz Snapdragon processor). The devices they use are largely outperformed by nowadays smartphones, but the comparison they make is still useful. In particular it shows that, for equivalent security levels, ECDSA is more efficient than RSA with respect to signature generation, but the opposite holds for signature verification. Furthermore, the signature is shorter with ECDSA than with RSA. By choosing ECDSA signatures, the communication overhead is reduced and the computation load mainly affects the initiator (because the signature verification is more costly than its generation), while RSA distributes the computation overhead on all nodes involved in the protocol and implies a higher communication overhead. Therefore, ECDSA is more adapted to our protocol as it implies a smaller message size and a fairer distribution of computation overhead.
It is worth noticing that the proposed protocol is not used for routing, but to bootstrap security associations from scratch. The proposed scheme can therefore be used as an anchor for further efficient key management based on these security associations. Using asymmetric cryptography to bootstrap security associations is a widely accepted concept, hence performance is not a critical issue for the proposed mechanism.
Related work
Key management in ad-hoc networks
The area of key management in opportunistic networking is quite new and the existing work in this area are rare: Farrell (2007) mentions some requirements of key management in DTN but no solution is proposed, and Asokan et al. (2007) evaluate ID-based cryptography in the context of DTN, but this solution is not suitable for content-based forwarding as mentioned in Section 2.2.1. In the broader area of peer-to-peer key management in MANETs many solutions have been proposed (Van Der Merwe et al., 2007) . These solutions can be classified in two main categories:
• Fully self-organised key management, which have been first proposed in Capkun et al. (2003) , and further studied in Cagalj et al. (2006) , and McCune (2009) . These solutions require no authority, and are based on self-certificates (PGP-like) which are then used to sign other trusted nodes' certificates to form chains of trust. Key management therefore requires high-mobility to efficiently establish the chains of trust. Unfortunately, trust establishment is a time consuming operation. Furthermore, such fully organised schemes are inherently vulnerable against Sybil attacks, which is a major issue for MLCE (see Section 2.3.2). Therefore, fully self-organised key management cannot fit to our problem.
• Authority-based solutions, rely on an external authority to bootstrap trust relations from certificates signed by the authority. In addition, most of them make use of an online authority with the accent on distributing this online authority either partially (Khalili et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2007; Xu and Iftode, 2004; Yi and Kravets, 2002; Zhou and Haas, 1999) or fully (Kong et al., 2001; Luo et al., 2002; Joshi et al., 2005) . All these approaches are based on threshold cryptography and require each certificate to be signed more than once online and therefore they are not suited to our problem either.
An important difference between all these solutions and our proposal is that key management in MANETs aims at establishing end-to-end keys whereas this is irrelevant in opportunistic networks. It is therefore hard to compare these solutions with ours, but we can tentatively say that our solution is in between the two mentioned categories: it makes use of an offline authority to prevent Sybil attacks, but online key agreement is self-organised and does not require an additional online authority, therefore it meets the DTN requirements.
Secure neighbourhood discovery
Secure neighbourhood discovery amounts to secure routing with a fixed number of hops instead of a given destination. Most existing secure routing solutions for MANETs [Ariadne (Hu et al., 2005b) , SEAD (Hu et al., 2002b) , SRP (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2003) ] implicitly assume the existence of pre-established trust relationship among nodes wishing to communicate with each other [like prior shared keys or an authentic TESLA (Perrig et al., 2002) key chain]. Establishing such trust relationship requires a secure distribution scheme, which requires either an online central authority or a secure routing which is the goal of these schemes. Hence, there is a cyclic dependency between secure routing and security services which was first analysed in Bobba et al. (2003) . The authors propose to break the dependency cycle by using a secure binding mechanism between an IP address and an uncertified public-private key pair, which results in a statistically unique and unspoofable IP address. Their solution cannot prevent Sybil attacks yet and therefore it is not suited to our problem.
In contrast to these solutions, our solution breaks the dependency cycle and prevents Sybil attacks, by doing at the same time key agreement and neighbourhood discovery securely thanks to certificates with unique pseudonyms provided by an offline IM. Our approach is therefore close to ARAN (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) with the noticeable difference that ARAN certificates are used to certify an IP address which is dynamic and therefore this implicitly requires that the Certification Authority is online. Furthermore, ARAN requires signatures on route requests and replies which represents a non-negligible added cost, and ARAN does not use hop-count and can therefore not be used for neighborhood discovery.
Conclusions
The analysis of the characteristics of opportunistic networks and content-based forwarding, lead us to the conclusion that key management in such networks should be self-organised and local. This locality also involves a correct view of the neighbourhood topology. We therefore designed a complete solution that enables bootstrapping of security associations along with secure neighbourhood discovery.
This solution based on pseudonym certificates and encapsulated signatures enables key agreement between a node (the initiator) and all its neighbors which are at distance less than lr-hops without pre-established trust relationship or infrastructure. The solution also enables the discovery of the neighbourhood's topology and withstands tampering by malicious nodes. We also proposed the use of an IM which provides each node with a unique certified pseudonym during a setup phase. This lightweight IM therefore effectively prevents Sybil attacks. Furthermore, the IM is offline and is not required during networking operations; therefore the key management scheme is self-organised.
The proposed scheme can therefore be used as an anchor to content-based forwarding in opportunistic networks based on multiple layer commutative encryption, which results in end-to-end confidentiality and privacy-preserving content-based forwarding solely based on a local and self-organised key management.
